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Since 1972 I have published an article each year on the world food 
and agriculture situation. Now, as the supply of the most recent, 
"World Hunger: Extent, Causes, and Cures," nears exhaustion, I find
little new to say. So instead of moving a few paragraphs around and 
pretending originality, I will simply reissue it.
Were I to do it over again, however, several modifications would 
be in order:
• The behavioral threshold approach to hunger quantification 
would be presented more forcefully. Neville EdirisingheJs 
recent study.!/ clearly demonstrates its efficacy, and also 
confirms the skill with which poor people the world over 
manage to allocate their resources so as to get by on very 
little. It also suggests that the intake levels at which 
people begin to substitute quality for quantity is lower 
than previously thought— further confirmation that the inter­
national minimum dietary standards are still too high.
• That the so-called vulnerable groups— young children and 
pregnant and lactating mothers— are the most subject to 
nutritional deprivation is now generally accepted. The 
usual method for estimating their numbers has been anthro­
pometry. That this method employs extremely arbitrary cri­
teria and is subject to serious limitations was highlighted 
in Seneka Abeyratne's study— / of child malnutrition in Sri 
Lanka. He demonstrates that protein-energy malnutrition 
among the young there is not nearly so pervasive as was once 
believed; that it is as much a function of health status as 
income; and that means are at hand— chiefly in the form of 
weaning food programs and oral rehydration therapy— for recti­
fication that can be both immediate and cheap.
® The latter conclusion is consistent with my suggestion—  
insufficiently stressed in the present paper-— that govern­
ments in the developing world rethink their approach to 
hunger alleviation. Traditionally this has involved some 
sort of price manipulation. Such intervention invariably 
becomes politicized and counterproductive to efforts to 
stimulate food production. Instead, I am convinced that 
governments should leave the market alone and focus invest­
ment on public health clinics and on works of water supply 
and sanitation.
• Finally, there is the problem of sub-Saharan Africa, the only 
part of the world where things may be getting worse rather 
than better. I tried to put this delicately, but would no 
longer do so. Governmental incompetence and corruption in 
Africa should be "held up to the world’s contempt and the food 
debacle there not be excused, as FAO seems to be trying, in 
terms of drought or as a legacy of the (ever more distant) 
days of colonialism.
1/ Neville Edirisinghe and Thomas T. Poleman, "Behavioral Thresh­
olds as Indicators of Perceived Dietary Adequacy or Inadequacy" (Cornell/ 
International Agricultural Economics Study, A. E. Res. 83-24, July 1983).
2/ Seneka Abeyratne and Thomas T. Poleman, "Socioeconomic Determi- 
nants_of Child Malnutrition in Sri Lanka: The Evidence from Galle and
Kalutara Districts" (Cbrnell/Intemational Agricultural Economics Study, 
A. E. Res. 83-25, July 1983).
WORLD HUNGER: EXTENT, CAUSES, AND CURES*
by
Thomas T. Poleman **
Let me make clear at the outset that there is no way to specify 
with certainty the extent of world hunger. To do so would require much 
more information than is presently at hand about the actual availability 
of food, the exact amount of food people need for proper nourishment, 
and how access to food varies among different income groups within a 
country. These limitations notwithstanding, I would hazard the guess 
that at no time in history has the world been as well fed as it is 
today. To argue otherwise would be to deny a basis for the increase-- 
from about 40 years to 55 years— that has occurred during the past 30 
years in life expectancy in the poorer countries. I would also guess 
that the principal nutrition problem in the world today is not hunger 
among the poor, but the result of overeating and underexercising by the 
affluent in the industrialized countries.
By so saying I do not want to suggest that hunger and its conse 
quences have all but disappeared. Rather it is to suggest that the 
problem is a manageable one and given proper governmental will and 
direction could be resolved in almost all parts of the world during the 
remaining years of the century.
Why then does the conventional wisdom come down so heavily on the 
other side? Ask the man in the street for his impression of what life^is 
like in the developing countries and he will invariably reply hungry.
This perception finds extensive support in the literature. We were, 
after all, assured 30 years ago by Lord Boyd-Orr, the First Director 
General of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
that "a lifetime of malnutrition and actual hunger is the lot of at least 
two—thirds of mankind," by one of the many alarmist books which captured 
the public’s attention in the mid-1960s that widespread famine would^over1 
take us by 1975, and just two years ago by the Carter administration’s 
Presidential Commission on World Hunger that the "world hunger problem is 
getting worse rather than better. There are more hungry people than ever 
before."
*Prepared for presentation at the University of Chicago/University 
of Minnesota/Cargill, Incorporated conference on "The Role of Markets m  
the World Food Economy," Minneapolis, 14-16 October 1982.
**Professor of International Food Economics.
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I. MEASURING HUNGER: THE EARLY ASSESSMENTS
The notion that the world is no longer able to feed itself and 
teeters uncontrollably on the brink of mass starvation may be traced 
to the formative years of the FAO and its early attempts to assess the 
extent of world hunger. These studies, and their methodological under­
pinnings, are worth reviewing because, although they are now discredited, 
their message has remained remarkably durable. This is because few of 
those who have seen fit to pronounce on world hunger— and this includes 
the recent Presidential Commission— have troubled to undertake original 
research of their own.
The findings of the early EAO studies and those of more recent work 
by FAO, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the World Bank 
are shown in Figure 1. The extent of disagreement among them is extra­
ordinary. Boyd-Orr’s conclusion that two-thirds of mankind were hungry 
came from FAOfs Second World Food Survey. An earlier survey suggested 
a lower figure. The USDA1s two World Food Budgets concluded that almost 
the entire population of the developing world lived in "diet deficit’ 
countries. FAO’s Third World Food Survey put the afflicted in such coun­
tries at about 60 percent and identified a shortage of protein as the 
principal problem. The World Bank saw a problem of roughly the same 
magnitude— involving about 1.2 billion people— but suggested the prime 
cause was shortfall of calories. In its two most recent studies the 
FAO also identified calories as the culprit, but put the total afflicted 
at something over 400 million.
The analytical approach followed in FAO*s first two World Food Sur­
veys and the two World Food Budgets prepared by USDA was simple in the 
extreme and may be summarized by the following equation:
To determine whether or not a country was experiencing a food problem, 
apparent per capita food availabilities, minus an allowance for wastage 
between the so-called retail level and actual ingestion, were set against 
estimates of per capita nutrient needs. Where and when availabilities 
exceeded requirements, all was presumed well; where they did not, the 
country or region*s entire population was considered to be inadequately 
nourished.
The failings of this approach are several and, when probed, obvious. 
First, it assumes that societies are sufficiently homogeneous in their 
food habits for average data to have meaning. This is certainly not the 
case in developed economies, where differences in income, locality, ethnic 
background, and place within the household have long been known to have 
marked effects on food behavior; and it is now recognized to be no less 
invalid for the developing world.
for human consumption 
365 X population
Food available Average daily
Loss $ recommended nutrient
allowance allowances
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FIGURE 1. PERSONS IDENTIFIED AS NUTRITIONALLY DEFICIENT IN 
IN MAJOR WORLD FOOD ASSESSMENTS
The size of the populations to which the assessments apply is 
indicated by the total height of bars.
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A further drawback of the approach is that it presupposed an ability 
to specify average food availabilities and needs with a fair degree of 
precision.
Problems of Estimating Food Availabilities
To estimate food availabilities one must construct a balance sheet, 
incorporating on the supply side measurements of production, trade, and 
stocks changes, and on the utilization side such items as seed and feed 
use and losses in storage. Availabilities for human consumption are 
derived as a residual and thus reflect the totality of error.
The error so introduced will almost invariably be in the direction 
of understatement. Understatement of production is a characteristic of 
most newly developed agricultural reporting systems. Wheat production 
in the USA is now recognized to have been 30 to 40 percent above that 
officially reported during the first decade (1866-1875) of USDA?s sta­
tistical efforts. In Mexico, the extent of understatement for maize 
during 1925-34, the Direccion General de Economia Rural * s first decade, 
was over 50 percent.
To this understandable tendency further complications can be added:
® The statistical officer in developing countries is frequently 
(and not irrationally) equated with the tax collector by, the 
farmer, whose response will he to minimize.
• Output which is not seen is not counted and where communica­
tions are poor a great deal is not seen.
• Much food production is for on-farm consumption and does not 
pass through commercial channels where it might he monitored.
• In tropical areas especially, many food crops are not grown 
in pure stands but mix-planted in fields of bewildering com­
plexity.
To generalize about the extent to which food availabilities in LDCs have 
been and are now understated is not easy. A reasonable assumption is 
that the accuracy of production estimates has improved with time and 
that the extent of understatement is now less than it was when FAQ pub­
lished its first World Food Survey. An exception may be sub-Saharan 
Africa, where independence has frequently been accompanied by a deteriora­
tion in the reporting systems established by colonial administrators.
When perfection may be anticipated is anybody*s guess. It was not until 
1902, 36 years after the effort began, that USDA began reporting wheat 
output with an acceptable margin of error; and not until the mid-1950s, 
with 30 years of experience in hand, was Mexico able to confidently 
measure its maize harvest.
Detailed studies of the food economies of Malaysia and Ceylon carried 
out by my students in the 1960s suggested that caloric availabilities 
in both were officially understated by between 10 and 15 percent. As the 
staple in both countries is rice grown under irrigated conditions, and 
thus relatively simple to quantify and as both countries have by the stan­
dards of the developing world an admirable statistical tradition, this
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10-15 percent is probably something of a minimum understatement. : 
where the amount of food actually available may be undercounted by 
rather more.
Problems of Estimating Food Requirements
Compounding this tendency to undercount food availabilities have 
been the difficulties associated with estimating food needs. Until 
recently these have been overstated. Nutrition is still a young science 
and our ability to establish minimal or desirable levels of intake is 
not nearly as precise as we would like it to be.
A person* s nutritional needs are a function of many things. a8e j 
sex, body size, activity patterns, health status, and individual make-up 
to mention the more important. Conceptually, knowing these variables, 
it should be possible to set minimum levels of intake for protein, energy, 
vitamins, and other nutrients sufficient to preclude overt deficiency 
disease in most of a population. As a practical matter it is not, and 
what were used as surrogates for such minimal criteria in the early food 
evaluations were the recommended allowances prepared as guidelines for 
dietitians and other nutritional workers. These allowances consciously 
err on the side of caution, both to incorporate a comfortable safety 
margin and to ensure that the substantial variations in food needs among 
individuals will be covered.
The recommended allowances are periodically modified and from the 
direction and magnitude of change it is possible to infer something of 
the probable extent by which minimum needs were overstated in the^past. 
With respect to energy allowances, the history of the FAO, the United 
States Food and Nutrition Board, and other responsible organizations has 
been one of continued downward modification. The energy ^ allowance for 
the United States ’’reference man1'— in his twenties, weighing 70 kilograms, 
and not very active— now stands at 2,700 calories, 500 calories less 
than the 1953 recommendation.
Apart from undue initial conservatism, the principal cause of this 
reduction is the increasingly inactive character of life in industrial 
societies. Physical effort is less and less demanded on the^job and 
the body moves from place to place less on its feet than on its seat.
It is not unlikely that the energy allowances suggested for the developed 
countries are now quite reasonable. Little remains to be understood of 
how urban man divides his day— it has become after all depressingly 
routinized— and, thanks to studies carried out in association with war­
time rationing programs in the United Kingdom and Germany, the energy 
costs of most activities are well known.
The same is not true for developing countries. Very few energy 
expenditure/activity studies have been conducted among rural or urban 
people in these regions and useful common denominators continue to be^ 
wanting. A key reason for this shortcoming is the difficulty of obtain­
ing reliable information on energy expenditure. The traditional^method 
for doing this is to record the energy costs of specific tasks with 
respirometer and then multiply the resulting factors by appropriate time 
spans. The problems are many. The respirometer is a clumsy instrument, 
it can be kept on a subject for only a few minutes and its presence is
hardly conducive to normal behavior. Moreover, time-span recording 
must be meticulously accurate in order to be useful. To obtain such 
information under primitive conditions without an impetus similar to 
wartime rationing is probably asking too much of the research priori­
ties of most LDCs.
In response to criticism that the energy allowances used in its 
early World Food Surveys were unrealistic surrogates for minimum needs, 
the FAO, lacking actual evidence from the LDCs, employed a different 
approach to establishing floor criteria beginning with its report to 
the 1974 World Food Conference. This was to estimate the minimal energy 
requirements of the average nonfasting person at 1.5 X his Basal Meta­
bolic Rate and to assume that some individuals might have a BMR as much 
as 20 percent below the norm.
It is difficult to fault this modification. Certainly the 1.2 BMR 
factor which results— .8 X 1.5 (BMR)— yields values which bear a clearer 
hallmark of reality. If anything, it errs on the side of being too low. 
Applied to Asia it suggests minimum per capita requirements of the order 
of 1,500 calories, as opposed to the criteria of 2,600 and 2,230-2,300 
calories, respectively, used in the first two World Food Surveys.
In the early FAO and USDA studies, the terms "undernourishment" 
("undernutrition") and "mainourishment" ("malnutrition") were widely 
used. Undernourishment is generally taken to mean a shortfall in caloric 
intake such that a person cannot maintain normal bodily activity without 
losing weight. Malnourishment, on the other hand, describes the lack or 
deficiency of one or more of the so-called protective nutrients— protein, 
the vitamins, and minerals.
The first two World Food Surveys defined the nutritional problems 
of the LDCs largely in terms of energy shortfalls and undernourishment.
In the Third World Food Survey insufficient protein availabilities and 
malnourishment were highlighted. Today most nutritionists concerned 
with the developing countries speak of protein-calorie (or protein-energy) 
malnutrition. This sees a shortage of energy again as the prime problem 
and takes into account that an apparent adequacy of protein can be con­
verted into a deficit should a portion of it be metabolized to compensate 
for insufficient energy intake. This major change in problem perception 
and terminology coincided with a drastic reduction in the recommended 
minimum allowances for protein.
As with energy allowances, the early FAO protein recommendation con- 
tained a comfortable safety factor as well as an allowance to take indi­
vidual variation into account. In 1971 an expert panel concluded that 
these had been excessive and reduced the daily per capita recommendation 
for adults by a third: from 61 grams of reference protein to 40.
The effect of this change was dramatic. Prior to the revision, 
simple comparisons of average availabilities and needs suggested that 
almost all the world's developing countries were deficient in protein; 
after it, hardly any of them. If the "protein gap" did not disappear 
overnight, its statistical underpinnings seemed to.
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Misleading Conclusions
Since they used food availability estimates that understated to 
compare against food requirement figures that overstated, it is not 
surprising that the early FAO and USDA global food assessments painted 
a gloomy picture of world hunger. Though the numbers varied,, the pic™ 
ture was one of hungry countries and of a world unable to feed its 
rapidly growing population. Insufficient production was seen as the 
problem. As the second of the USDAr s World Food Budgets put it.
Two-thirds of the world’s people live in countries with 
nutritionally inadequate national average diets. . . The
diet-deficit countries are poor and food deficiencies merely 
reflect the low level of income in general. . . The basic 
problem of the diet—deficit countries is one of productivity.
The people cannot produce enough food to feed themselves or 
produce enough other products to buy the food they require.
Food production has barely been able to keep ahead of popu­
lation growth, much less provide for the expanded demand 
resulting from some improvement in per capita income, most 
of which goes for food.
We now know that such conclusions seriously distort reality. The 
record of agricultural productivity in the LDCs has not been all that bad. 
According to such generally used series of "world" food output as that 
currently issued by the USDA (Figure 2), the LDCs over the past 30 years 
have expanded production rather more rapidly than the developed countries, 
a remarkable achievement in view of the minimum priority given to agri- 
c ilture in their development programs. Population growth, to be sure, 
absorbed most of the gains, but with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa 
modest per capita improvement occurred.
There have, of course, been year-to-year fluctuations in this 
trend— fluctuations whose import has tended to be magnified by those 
who would influence public opinion. The first apparent faltering ^ came 
in the mid-1960s and resulted almost exclusively from two successive 
droughts in India. Indian production bulks so large in the LDC aggre­
gate that major fluctuations in her harvest influence visibly the index 
for all developing countries. This fact, however, was lost on many com­
mentators. Conditioned by the early FAO and USDA findings to think of 
all LDCs as "hungry" and hearing of massive food aid shipments of the 
30 million tons of grain shipped by the United States under Public Law 
480 during the two years ending in June 1967 half went to India— not a 
few were inclined to predict imminent global starvation. The Paddock 
brothers went so far as to specify 1975 as the year in which this would 
take place.
A reaction set in almost immediately and again closely mirrored the 
Indian situation. A sequence of favorable years in terms^of weather was 
accompanied by introduction into the Punjab of high-yielding varieties 
of Mexican wheat. The result was the index for all low-income countries 
rose steeply, as did per capita availabilities. The assessment was 

















































*Data from: U. S. Department of Agriculture, World Indices of Agri-
ural and Food Production. Washington, D.C.: HR.fi Statistical Bulletin
July 1981, pp, 12-17. Developed countries.: North America, Europe,
, Japan, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand; less developed 
tries: Latin America, Asia (except Japan and Communist countries),
Africa (except South Africa).
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These were the years when the Green Revolution began to be talked of.
The situation in Northwest India, together with the introduction o 
high-yielding, fertilizer-responsive rice in the wetter portions of 
Asia, led many to believe that a fundamental change had taken place 
and that feeding the world*s rapidly increasing population no longer 
posed problems. So pervasive was this optimism that the FAO went so 
far as to suggest, in its State of Food and Agriculture for 1969, that 
the food problems of the future might well be ones of surplus rather 
than shortage.
The factors underlying the second pause— the "food crisis" of 
the early 1970s— were more complex and primarily involved the developed 
rather than the developing countries. In brief, it resulted from an 
unhappy coincidence of four main influences: an intentional running
down of stocks and a holding down of production in the United States; 
unprecedented prosperity and rising demand in Europe and Japan, whic 
led to rapid increases in the use of grain for livestock feed; a 
general relaxation of attention to agriculture in the LDCs; and unfa 
vorable weather in India, the African Sahel, and the Soviet Union.
The role of the Soviet Union was particularly destabilizing. The 
failure of its 1972 harvest triggered the run on world supplies and 
the short crop of 1975 prolonged it. Nonetheless, the crisis was truly 
global in that the price rises were general and in that it exposed the 
weaknesses of the international agricultural order. International 
is the operative word: most affected were the countries trading in
the world market. Least involved were the largely self-reliant LUC 
economies.
More recently the pendulum of assessment has again swung. Save 
in the Soviet Union, harvests almost everywhere were favorable during 
the latter half of the 1970s. Although some perceive in the upturn m  
the quantity of grain moving from North America to the developing 
world a sign that the latter is increasingly unable to feed .itsel > 
this interpretation is incorrect. As Figure 3 shows, the bul o 
increase is going not as food to the poorest countries, but as ee 
to those middle-income countries whose populations are beginning to 
experience sufficient affluence to effectively demand more meat in 
their diet. To the extent there is talk among knowledgeable observers 
of potential crisis, it is usually in the context of ^the events 
of the early 1970s repeating themselves sometime during the next 
decade. There have, after all, been few changes in policies that would 
mitigate against such a recurrence following a year or two of below 
trend production.
This story of modest progress in the LDCs clearly does not tally 
with the pessimism of the early FAO and USDA studies. It does not _ 
follow, however, that the postwar years have witnessed a reduction m  
the actual number of people nutritionally distressed. For the sugges 
tion that increased production alone could eliminate hunger was only 


























FIGURE 3. WORLD GRAIN TRADE, 1960/61-1980/81*
M E T  I M P O R T S
*Data from: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural
Service. Years are July-June marketing years. Low income countries 
are defined as those with a 1979 per capita GNP of US$670 or less.
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A second unfortunate legacy was the notion that countries could 
be classified as hungry or well fed. It is now clear that, to the extent 
that this notion has validity, the early studies misrepresented reality. 
With food availability estimates that understated set against requirement 
figures that overstated, the cards were so stacked that almost all LDCs 
could be classified as "diet deficit." Redone with truly accurate infor­
mation, it is probable that few countries would be so classified. Much 
as the protein gap proved a statistical illusion, the list of diet-deficit 
countries would be whittled away.
But such a computation would perpetuate the most important failing 
of the early methodology. It is individuals, not countries, who experi­
ence nutritional deprivation, and average country data tell us little 
about the individual. It is now a commonplace among serious pronounce­
ments on the food situation that, equitably distributed, global supplies 
are sufficient to feed all. The problem is that all within a country do 
not have equal access to existing supplies, and it is to consideration 
of the impact of this inequality that I now turn.
II, MEASURING THE IMPACT OF INCOME
The first study which attempted to take account of the income effect 
was FAO’s Third World Food Survey, published in 1963. Largely the work 
of the eminent Indian statistician, P . V. Sukhatme, then Director of FAO s 
Statistics Division, the study is spotty in its description of methodology. 
This is understandable. Our insights into the effect of income rest 
largely on household budget surveys, and if there are few of these today 
of acceptable quality, there were even fewer two decades ago.
Nonetheless, on the basis of evidence from Maharashtra State in 
India and elsewhere, Dr, Sukhatme concluded:
. . .  as a very conservative estimate some 20 percent of the 
people in the underdeveloped areas are undernourished and 60 
percent are malnourished. Experience shows that the majority 
of the undernourished are also malnourished. It is believed 
therefore . . . some 60 percent of the people in the under­
developed areas comprising some two thirds of the world's 
population suffer from undernutrition or malnutrition or both.
This, of course, was before the recommended allowances for protein 
were loweredj with revis ion, the 60 percent malnourished presumably disap­
peared, On the other hand, Dr. Sukhatme*s 20 percent undernourished is 
not too much different from FAO’s current estimate of persons suffering 
protein-calorie deprivation.
In its documentation prepared for discussion at the World Food Con­
ference of November 1974, the FAO took due account of the 1971 reduction 
in protein allowances and also employed the 1.2 BMR criterion for minimum
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energy needs for the first time. Though this yielded floor values well 
below the energy requirement figures used by Dr. Sukhatme— 1,500 as 
opposed to 2,300 calories for the Far East— the proportion of LDC popu­
lation whose estimated intake fell below it actually increased; from 
20 percent to 25 percent.
It is difficult to imagine how this increase came about, and the 
FA0 offered no explanation. My suspicion is that the figures were 
derived less through research than through a political decision imposed 
from on high. Few bureaucrats wish to admit that the problem they are 
relieving is a modest one, and international bureaucrats are no excep­
tion. As Table 1 shows, the figures almost certainly contain an element 
of arbitrariness. Between April 1974, when the preliminary documenta­
tion was released, and the conference itself in November, the estimated 
LDC population with intakes falling below 1,2 BMR was raised from 360 
million to 434 million— or from exactly 20 percent to exactly 25 percent.
I confess to similar skepticism about the findings of the two most 
recent studies which attempted to measure the Impact of income— the 
World Bank study carried out in 1976 and FA0’s Fourth World Food Survey, 
published a year later. Although they used broadly similar techniques 
for estimating the effect of income— the main difference was that the 
1.2 BMR floor criterion was used by FA0; the old recommended dietary 
allowances by the World Bank— their conclusions differed wildly. As 
Figure 1 indicates, the FAO concluded that about 450 million people were 
suffering from protein-calorie malnutrition; the World Bank put the 
number at almost 1,2 billion. Not knowing what to do about this dis­
crepancy, the recent Presidential Commission on World Hunger mentioned 
both figures.
Central to the analysis in both studies was the concept of calorie- 
income elasticity; that is, of the increment in caloric Intake associ­
ated with an increment .in income. The elasticity or elasticities used 
by the FAO were not stated; the World Bank study postulated a range of 
from .10 to .30 for people just meeting their minimal food needs.
Although the reasons for its selection were not specified, a calorie- 
income elasticity of .15 was deemed most appropriate, and on the basis 
of it and some heroic assumptions about income distribution in Asia,
Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, the study concluded:
• • ■ that 56 percent of the population in developing coun­
tries (some 840 million people) had calorie-deficient diets 
in excess of 250 calories a day. Another 19 percent (some 
290 million people) had deficits of less than 250 calories 
a day.
There are a number of reasons for giving minimal credence to the 
resulting figure of almost 1.2 billion hungry people. The World Bank 
analysts were apparently unaware of the tendency for food production in 
developing countries to be underreported; and their use of the old 
recommended dietary allowances as surrogates for minimal needs was sur­
prising to say the least. Further, there are serious problems with the 
concept of calorie-income elasticity. It misleads by suggesting that 
the relationship between income changes and changes in energy Intake is 
a simple one, reducible to one tidy figure, This is not the case.
Figure 4, prepared ten years ago to summarize the effect income has 
on nutrient intake in Sri Lanka., is suggestive of the real world. The
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TABLE 1. WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE: PRELIMINARY AND FINAL ESTIMATE
OF NUMBER OF PEOPLE THOUGHT TO HAVE HAD AN INSUFFICIENT 













Developed 1,074 3 3 28 28
b/Developing— 1,751 20 25 360 434
_ w b / Far East— 1,020 22 30 221 301
Latin America 283 13 13 37 36
Africa 273 25 25 68 67
Near East 171 20 18 34 30
World-^ 2,825 14 16 388 462
^Preliminary estimates from United Nations, World Food Conference. 
Prelim"!nary Assessment of the World Food Situation, Present and Future. 
Rome, April 1974, p. 39. Final estimates from United Nations, World 
Food Conference. Assessment of the World Food Situation, Present and 
Future. Item 8 of the Provisional Agenda. November 1974, p. 66.
a/ Principal modifications shown in italics.
bf Excluding Asian centrally planned economies.
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FIGURE 4. APPARENT PER CAPITA DAILY ENERGY AND PROTEIN 
AVAILABILITIES IN SRI LANKA, 1969-70, BY INCOME CLASS*
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*Reproduced from: Poleman, Thomas T. Income and Consumption:
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household budget survey on which it is based was then almost unique- 
It covered almost 10,000 households representative of the entire country 
and was conducted and analyzed with uncommon integrity.
Yet, even with this survey, one can infer little with confidence 
about the extent of protein-calorie malnutrition in Sri Lanka. The 
most important dietary adjustment historically associated with rising 
income is a decline in the importance of the starchy staple foods—  
read rice in Asia— as sources of energy and a shift to the more expen­
sive, flavorous foods such as meat, fish, and vegetables. In Sri Lanka 
this tendency is observable among only the four uppermost income classes 
(20 percent of the population), and then, because of egalitarian measures 
imposed by the government, only weakly so. Between the lowest class (43 
percent of the people) and the next lowest (37 percent), the sole change 
is quantitative. There is a difference in apparent per capita daily 
availabilities of 200 calories and 10 grams of protein, but none in 
diet compos it ion.
What are we to infer from this? Because increased quantity not 
quality was purchased with increased income, the jump from 2,050 to 2,250 
calories could be interpreted as implying behavior consistent with 
enforced reduced activity among the very poor (or actual physical dete­
rioration) and that the 1.2 BMR energy floor of 1,500 calories is an 
unrealistically low figure for minimum needs in Sri Lanka. But just 
as reasonably, one might postulate caloric adequacy among that element 
of society which is too poor to waste anything and which, given the 
very high rate of unemployment in Sri Lanka, leads a less active life 
and therefore has lower energy needs. Thus it is possible to have it 
either way: depending on your assumptions, you can prove beyond a
statistical doubt that 43 percent of Ceylonese suffer protein-calorie 
malnutrition or none do.
Income, then, is clearly crucial, but hasty evaluations of its 
impact are out of place. If its effect is to be properly understood, 
the evidence at hand must be subjected to painstaking scrutiny.
An essential backdrop to such scrutiny is an understanding of how 
poor people over the centuries have contrived to feed themselves and
the sorts of changes their diets undergo as they become more wealthy.
This was the subject of some truly pioneering research carried out 
during the 1930s and 1940s by Merrill K . Bennett. He noted that the 
very poor everywhere would seek to maximize the nutritional return per 
outlay for food by building their diets around foods composed princi­
pally of starch: wheat, rice, potatoes, cassava, and the like. This
is so because of the cheapness of these starchy staples, whether 
expressed as market price or production cost. Far less land and far 
less labor are needed to produce a thousand calories of energy value 
in the form of the starchy staples than in the form of any other food­
stuff. Meat prodijcers by comparison are inefficient converters; an 
animal must be fed between three and ten pounds of grain for it to pro­
duce a pound of meat. But most people enjoy meat, and they turn away 
from the starchy staples as they become wealthier.
A simple way to rank diets is according to the percentage of total 
calories supplied by the starchy staples and an easy way to record 
change is to monitor shifts in this starchy staple ratio. In the 
United States the ratio stood at 55 percent a hundred years ago, when 
our great-great-grandparents consumed large amounts of bread and pota­
toes. Today our diets are dominated by meat, fats and oils, sugar,
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vegetables5 and dairy products. We pay more for such a diet and pre­
sumably enjoy it more,. But it does not follow that it is a better diet.
Faced with so much conflicting material about the extent of world 
hunger, the USDA a few years ago asked me to look into the basis for 
the confusion. Among my conclusions was one which could be anticipated 
at the outset. This is that there still is not enough evidence about 
the effect of income on food behavior for us to generalize with confi­
dence. Such evidence must come from household budget surveys, and 
carefully conducted surveys of broadly representative samples are still 
few for the developing countries.
About halfway through my research for USDA, it occurred to me that 
since it was not likely that the next few years would see more accurate 
estimates of either food availabilities or minimal nutritional needs in 
the developing countries, we should consider abandoning altogether the 
approach of comparing availabilities with needs, and search instead for 
behavior indicative of perceived dietary adequacy or inadequacy. Would 
not Bennett's progression of dietary change provide the necessary frame­
work for such a search and would not the point where households began 
to purchase quality instead of quantity be the threshold we sought?
Preliminary analysis by my students of five recent surveys, con­
ducted in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Peru, and Brazil, indicates 
the idea has merit— but that it will be of less value in countries 
where, as in Sri Lanka, one staple is all pervasive. This is because 
initial substitution will take place among the starchy staples; and 
where one food dominates, the substitution will be between quality grades 
of that commodity, shifts which are extremely difficult to monitor.
Figure 5, based on data collected in Brazil in 1974/75, is suggestive 
of what we are finding where more than one staple and a clear preference 
hierarchy prevail. It is apparent that the diet at the lower end of the 
income range is that of poor people: the four starchy staples (cassava,
maize, rice, and wheat) supply over half of total caloric avail­
ability. But it would not appear to be the diet of people who perceive 
themselves threatened with hunger. Additional calories are not pur­
chased as income increases. Instead, consumption of cassava, the least 
preferred staple, falls off sharply, its place taken by rice and wheat
bread.
This type of behavior, which is also evident in the data for the 
other countries examined, is less suggestive of widespread hunger in 
the LDCs than it is of the ability of the people there to shrewdly 
allocate their limited resources so as to get by on what by the stan­
dards of the industrialized world is very little. And lest it be 
though that the poor were excluded from the surveys, be assured that 
they were not. The Brazilian data are for the north-eastern part of 
the country, Brazil's poorest region, and the survey has been suppressed 
by the government because of the social inequality it reveals.
III. REMEDIAL APPROACHES
I am sure that it has occurred to a number of you that while feeling 
free to criticize the work of the FAO, USDA, and the World Bank, I have 
cleverly avoided offering any numbers of my own. Be assured that I will. 
But before doing this, I would like to discuss in a general way the vari­
ous strategies which have been put forth for eliminating hunger. Since 
the nutritional problems of the developing countries are less a reflection 
of insufficient production than of the poor's inability to effectively
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FIGURE 5, NORTHEAST BRAZIL: APPARENT PER CAPITA DAILY CONSUMPTION OF
MAJOR STARCHY STAPLES AMONG LOW-INCOME CLASSES, 1974-75
(calories)
_1 / Plus other roots and tubers (5 percent of total).
*Data from: Neville Edirisinghe, "Behavioral Thresholds as Indi­
cators of Perceived Dietary Adequacy or Inadequacy" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, 1983).
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demand a satisfactory diet, these strategies must take into account the 
extent to which the normal course of development, can be expected to 
raise income.
The Income/Employment Backdrop
Increased levels of food production will, of course, continue to 
be required, but the evidence for most areas points to this being forth­
coming. I have noted that the record of LDC agriculture over the past 
quarter century has not been unimpressive; that despite the minimal 
attention given agriculture in most LDCs, output has expanded no less 
rapidly than in the industrialized countries and, save in Africa, more 
than kept pace with population growth*
What is all the more remarkable about this is that it has taken 
place without the huge upsurge in yields which has so transformed 
agriculture in the developed countries. Figure 6, in which are compared 
the production, area, and yield of all grains immediately after the war 
and recently, offers some perspective. Prior to the war, grain yields 
everywhere averaged in the neighborhood of one ton per hectare. By 1980, 
as the result of greater use of fertilizer, improved seed varieties, and 
better cultivation practices, yields had more than doubled in the developed 
countries. In the LDCs, on the other hand, the gains have been compara­
tively modest. Despite the publicity given the Green Revolution and cer­
tain spectacular accomplishments, LDC average yields have increased to 
only a bit above where they were in the developed countries at the begin­
ning of the postwar upsurge.
The systematic application of the scientific method to food farming 
in the developing world is very recent, dating no further back than the 
mid-1940s. It is not surprising, then, that the scope for improving 
yields has been only superfically exploited. Moreover, breeding work 
until just this decade ignored the root crops and concentrated on wheat, 
rice, and maize; and even for these crops yields have risen to only 
fraction of the potential. A substantial share of the rice produced in 
Bangladesh and Thailand is of the floating variety, able to grow up to a 
foot per day if flooding demands it. It is hardly an exaggeration to 
say that work is only beginning on this unusual crop. That the payoff 
is likely to be great goes without saying.
If the LDCs are potentially capable of enormous increases in food 
production, it is not possible to be equally sanguine about the outlook 
for providing productive employment for their populations. In part 
this pessimism recognizes the selective nature of all economic change 
some are caught up in the process, others left out— but above all it 
mirrors the number of people who will be entering the labor force between 
now and the year 2000.
Their number is truly staggering. Figure 7 illustrates a projection 
prepared a few years ago by the International Labor Office. Between 
1970 and 2000 it is expected that the LDC labor force will double— from 
about one to two billion people. The billion new jobs that must be found 
are roughly twice the number presently existing in the industrialized 
countries and mean that the LDCs will be called on to transform them­
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FIGURE 1. ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, RECENT YEARS 
AND PROJECTIONS TO 2000*
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ( i n c l u d i n g  USSR and E. Europe)
N o n a g r i c u l t u r e
A g r i c u l t u r e  —
1950
.5
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
*Data from: International Labour Organization. Labor Force Pro.jec- 
tions. Geneva, 1971. United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization. 
The State of Food and Agriculture— 1973. Rome, 1973, pp. 131, 138.
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just one country, it means that during the remainder of the century 
Mexico will add to its labor force each year about the same number of 
new entrants as the USA and Canada together were able to absorb during 
the boom years of the 1950s and 1960s.
The ILO projection sees few of the new entrants being absorbed into 
agriculture, and one must ask whether this need be so. The basis for it 
is the selectivity of the various technical breakthroughs that have so 
far characterized the Green Revolution, To the layman the term Green 
Revolution conjures up visions of miracle seeds which offer all farmers 
the same potential for dramatic increases in yield. In fact, the high- 
yielding varieties have not been designed to he introduced alone, hut 
as one component of a package involving a host of complementary inputs: 
fertilizers, adequate water, and effective control of disease, insects, 
and weeds to mention the more obvious. Thus the miracle rices are highly 
responsive to fertilizer and yield well only under irrigated conditions. 
Simply to provide the conditions under which they can be introduced can 
be time-consuming and expensive. To the extent that the new systems are 
specific to particular ecological conditions, benefits will clearly be 
restricted. Equally obvious is that those best able to command the new 
inputs— the larger and wealthier farmers— -will reap the lion’s share of 
the benefits.
The experience of Mexico is a case in point, Mexico was the site of 
the first ’’agricultural miracle’1 of the postwar period, thanks to the 
Rockefeller-funded Office of Special Studies (now CIMMYT). The achieve­
ments were impressive. The output of maize increased from about 3.5 
million tons during the late 1940s to nine million tons in 1968. Average 
yields per hectare almost doubled: from 700 to 1300 kilograms. The
performance of wheat was even more spectacular: from 300,000 tons to
over 2.5 million tons in just 20 years, with yields quadrupling to 3.2 
tons per hectare. Cotton and other crops for export fared almost as 
well.
But, as every Mexican knows, this extraordinary achievement was 
localized both geographically and with respect to its impact on the 
rural population. Change has largely been confined to the north and 
the north-west, where the program of government sponsored irrigation 
opened up expanses of highly productive land, and the Gulf coastal strip, 
the one portion of the country receiving abundant rainfall. Though 
lip service throughout the period was paid to continued agrarian 
reform, the great majority of the rural population was bypassed.
Today less than 5 percent of the holdings occupy almost two-thirds 
of the irrigated area and account for over half the value of produc­
tion. In contrast, 85 percent of farms have access to only 4 percent 
of irrigated land and contribute a mere 20 percent of output by value.
While the selective impact of their breakthroughs came as a shock 
to the Rockefeller scientists and their Mexican colleagues, it should 
not have, A similar selectivity characterized the innovations which 
transformed agriculture in Europe and North America during the 19th
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century. But here the historical parallel begins to break down. There 
is a great difference between the cities of last century5s developing 
countries and those of today’s. A hundred years ago the bypassed or 
displaced farmer could look to the city for opportunity. Industry was 
growing, and as Industry then had high labor requirements, virtually 
all who left the land found jobs. Today the movement to town rests 
on less solid foundations. Though urbanization in the LDCs is proceed­
ing at a breakneck pace, most of such industrialization as is taking 
place is capital-, not labor-demanding. To a depressing extent most 
urban centers continue as administrative and trading centers. Suitable 
jobs are far fewer than people in search of them.
The prospect, then, is for two groups of persons to be excluded from 
the course of development: those bypassed by progress in the countryside
and the underemployed of the towns. The proportion of the population 
presently falling within the two groups is anybody's guess. Governments 
in the developing world do not collect data on unemployment and under-^ - 
employment, and if they were to the findings would be too distasteful 
politically to permit release. The World Bank and other international 
agencies speak of the "lower 40 percent," and even if this figure is a 
very rough estimate, it is probably a fair one. Somewhere between a 
quarter and a half of the population of the developing world is being 
bypassed by the forward march of economic change.
Recognition that the income effect cannot be relied on to eliminate 
all nutritional deficiencies within the lifetime of many of those most 
seriously afflicted has given rise to a host of alternative proposals, 
their number, in the words of one observer, being indicative "of how 
much of a growth industry human nutrition and world hunger activity has 
become." They divide in two broad groupings: those which would look to
correcting the causes of economic inequality and those which would aim 
at affording a measure of short-term relief.
Proposals falling within the first category range from the hopelessly 
naive to the outright revolutionary, but include a broad center setting 
forth conditions for "growth with equity." These include:
• An emphasis on developing the rural sector and on the immedi­
ate imp1ementation of land reform.
• The retargeting of production toward meeting the minimum needs 
of all.
• The use of "appropriate"— by which is meant labor-intensive—  
technology.
• A willingness to view the Chinese and Cuban experiences with 
tolerance.
Proposals of this type have taken on a certain air of dogma among 
nutrition planners at the World Bank and the United States Agency for 
International Development, but one wonders to what end. Since so many 
of the changes visualized fly in the face of the interests of established 
elites, they are not likely to be implemented without protracted struggle. 
Furthermore, there is the very real danger— as El Salvador demonstrates—
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that any such struggle would come to be seen in terms of the East West 
conflict.
Treating the Symptoms
Given these political problems and the magnitude of the employment 
dilemma, my suspicion is that both the West and a majority of LDCs will 
not attempt to resolve the causes of poverty in a generation, but will 
seek instead to treat the symptoms. Are there means whereby those 
excluded from the development process can be helped to command a mini­
mally acceptable diet? The answer is yes, but bringing this about will 
not be easy.
Measures for easing the plight of the nutritionally deprived without 
transforming the social structure include those designed to increase food 
consumption without a corresponding rise in food expenditures and those 
that improve the nutritive value of given foods.
Fortification of traditional foodstuffs with special nutrients is 
the most attractive means of accomplishing the latter. lodization of 
salt is a classic example, as is the admixture to milled cereals of niacin, 
iron, thiamin, riboflavin, and calcium. The impact of such measures can 
be widespread and immediate. Beriberi, for instance, was endemic on the 
famed Bataan Peninsula of the Philippines immediately after the second 
world war. With the introduction of thiamin enrichment of rice, it vir­
tually disappeared. The problem with this approach, of course, is that 
enrichment is only possible when foods are centrally processed; and in 
the very poor countries few are.
Similarly flawed are most of the schemes designed to permit greater 
consumption of food for a given level of expenditure. These usually 
involve some form of price manipulation by government, whether through 
direct procurement in the countryside, by subsidizing aspects of produc­
tion or consumption, or by controlling the price paid by consumers.
Virtually all developing countries have one or more programs of 
this type, and as their effect is to transfer income, the motivation 
for them has been more political than nutritional. Nonetheless their 
nutritional impact can be appreciable. In Sri Lanka, for instance, 
rice was from the second world war to a year or two ago rationed\ 
that is, virtually the entire population was entitled to a weekly quan­
tity either free or at a subsidized price. Throughout most of the 
period this amounted to two pounds per head per week, or the equivalent 
of about 475 calories per day. Most observers credit this program with 
having contributed to the well-being of Sri Lankan people, as they do 
the Egyptian program of subsidizing the retail prices of staple foods 
in Cairo and Alexandria. The cost, however, of such schemes can be 
high. The rationing program in Sri Lanka regularly absorbed between 
15 and 20 percent of the government’s budget, and was abandoned by the 
current leadership as being incompatible with rapid economic growth.
One estimate of the cost of the Egyptian food subsidy put it at a 
twelfth of the country's GNP. Neither program would have been possible 
without concessional food from abroad.
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In addition to their expense, the problems with programs of this 
type are several and severe;
© They tend to be restricted to the urban centers— the Egyptian 
and Bangladesh cases being the most prominent — and thus have 
minimal impact on the very poor, most of whom still live in 
the countryside. In Bangladesh, proof of employment is a pre­
requisite for being issued a ration card,
• If not political from their inception, they quickly become 
politicized, with the result that modification is difficult.
An attempt to reduce the consumer food subsidy triggered such 
severe riots in Cairo in January 1977 that the plan was imme­
diately rescinded. The price and wage distortions they engender 
thus tend to become permanent.
Where not dependent on food aid from abroad, the schemes tend 
to rely on low procurement prices to keep costs down. In either 
case the effect is to discourage the growth of domestic agricul­
ture.
This disincentive effect is probably the most telling of the objec­
tions to both food aid and the various distribution and subsidy schemes 
as vehicles for combating malnutrition. To get around it a number of 
two-price systems and other devices have been proposed. By far the' 
simplest and--when it is remembered that hunger is not all pervasive—  
the most appealing of these is to channel assistance in kind directly 
to those at greatest risk through maternal and child health clinics.
To some, this suggestion no doubt will seem a step in the wrong 
direction. For it is precisely this type of targeted intervention which 
was for long central to the (modest) activities of the more traditional 
nutritionists working in developing countries and which has been down­
graded by the new wave of nutrition planners in the World Bank, FAO and 
the US Agency for International Development. Yet there are, I believe, 
compelling reasons for its use.
IV. ASSISTING THE NUTRITIONALLY VULNERABLE
If we do not know how many among the poor in the LDCs suffer nutri­
tional deprivation, nutritionists are agreed that the preschool child 
and the pregnant and lactating mother are those most likely to be adversely 
effected by protein-calorie malnutrition (PGM) . There are several reasons 
for this. The early growth and reproduction phases are nutritionally the 
most demanding in the life cycle;
• The total energy cost of a pregnancy is estimated to average 
between 40,000 and 80,000 calories.
• To produce 850 milliliters of milk dally during lactation, a 
mother*s energy needs will be about 600 calories above normal.
• Because they are growing so rapidly, the infant and young 
child require more than twice the number of calories per unit
of body weight as do adults and half again as much as adolescents.
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Yet it is precisely the mother and young child whose needs can be 
reflected least in the choice of foods purchased by the household 
and who may be the residual claimants on that which has been pre­
pared for all to eat.
Discrimination against mothers and the young in feeding habits 
reflects educational as well as income deficiencies. It is not just 
that undesirable food taboos relate particularly to the mother and her 
young; where households do not eat together, the father and elders will 
typically satisfy themselves first, and the women and children get what is 
left. Adult tastes, rather than those of the infant, will be the usual 
criteria of dietary excellence, with the result that much of the animal 
protein a meal contains can be impossible for the very young to swallow.
The younger the child, moreover, the less well he is able to fend for 
himself at the table. And In times of shortage the mother is likely to 
defer to her children, not realizing that is is not only she, but her 
unborn child, who will suffer the consequences.
In its extreme form, PCM among the young occurs either as kwashiorkor 
or marasmus or sometimes combination of the two. Kwashiorkor is generally 
the result of an inadequate intake of protein relative to calories. It 
typically affects children who, after a period of breast feeding, are 
weaned onto starchy staples low in protein— ’Such as the tropical roots 
and tubers— -or sugary foods. It is most common in those parts of tropical 
Africa where roots, tubers, and bananas are the dominant starchy staples; 
indeed kwashiorkor comes from the Ga and means "disease that occurs when 
displaced from the breast by another child."
Marasmus, on the other hand, arises from an insufficiency of both 
energy intake and protein. The condition usually occurs in the first 
year of life and among the children of undernourished women. They are 
commonly of low birthweight and even in their first few months will show 
large weight-for-age deficits. Marasmus by definition is chronic, whereas 
kwashiorkor is an acute condition amenable to rapid reversal.
Cases of pure kwashiorkor or marasmus seem to be the exception rather 
than the rule. Instead, most severely malnourished children will present 
signs and symptoms of both conditions and perhaps even alternate between 
the two. In addition to low weight for age and other overt physical signs, 
symptoms are apathy, instability, and poorly developed motor skills.
Although marasmic children may be at risk of outright starvation, the 
main danger to the severely malnourished lies in their diminished resis­
tance to other disease. Should they survive these, they may well go 
through life permanently impaired, both mentally and in the height and 
weight they will ultimately attain. Although the linkages between severe 
PCM and brain growth and development are by no means understood, they 
give rise to particular concern.
Compared with its impact on pregnant and lactating mothers and the 
very young,the adverse effects of PCM on the other elements of a population 
are likely to be moderate. (Exceptions, of course, are the aged and the
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inf irm; on them the impact can be devastating.) This is because these 
elements are either not growing so rapidly or have stopped growing 
altogether and can adapt to reduced energy intake by either taking off 
body weight or by curtailing activity.
The human body is remarkably adaptive to reduced levels of food 
intake. Controlled studies among adults have shown that if caloric 
intake is cut to 50 percent of normal, body weight will drop within a 
few months by about a quarter. Thereafter a reduced level of activity 
can be maintained for many months before additional weight loss sets in 
and the incidence of nutrition-related disease rises. Thus the after­
effects among adults of war-induced privation in the Netherlands in 
1944-45 and in Biafra in 1968-69 are not thought to have been lasting; 
and certain groups in Africa may experience with no apparent impairment 
significant changes in body weight in association with the preharvest 
hunger phenomenon. This is not to suggest that the lethargy often 
observed among the poor in developing countries is not an adjustment to 
inadequate dietaries; only that it is reversible and need only be tem­
porary.
Some nutritionists have suggested that cases of frank marasmus and 
kwashiorkor among the very young are but the tip of an enormous iceberg 
of PCM in the developing world and that for every child demonstrating 
symptoms of clinical PCM there may be 99 others who are inadequately 
nourished, grow poorly, and are highly susceptible to disease infection.
The iceberg analogy may indeed be appropriate, but should be treated 
with skepticism. Certainly attempts to quantify the submerged portion—  
where no demonstrable harm is being done— do not yet warrant scientific 
credence.
Estimating the extent of PCM among young children involves the inci­
pient science of nutritional anthropometry and debate attends the stan­
dards for healthy children it should employ, the measurements it should 
involve —  whether weight for age, height for age, or weight for height—  
and where the cut-off criteria should be established. The reference 
standards usually employed are those of the US National Academy of 
Sciences and are defended on the grounds that within the 6-71 month age 
group possible distortions resulting from individual or racial differences 
will be minimal.
Very few follow-up studies of the health experience of children 
displaying specific anthropometric deficiencies have been carried out, 
and until such evidence is in hand and country-specific benchmarks have 
been determined, anthropometric evaluations should be interpreted with 
caution. Nevertheless, it has become common practice to define severe 
PCM as being evidenced by a weight-for-age of less than 60 percent of 
standard and the moderate form as being reflected by weights in the 60-80 
percent range. Following (more or less) these definitions, the findings 
of the hundred or so anthropometric surveys available a decade ago have 
been summarized in Figure 8. It is apparent that only a small fraction 
of children— in most of the surveys just one or two percent— -suffered 
from severe PCM and perhaps for each one of these,10 or 15 were moderately 
afflicted. But beyond this, generalization is impossible. Most of the 
surveys covered small samples of questionable typicality, and the range 
in findings is too extreme to permit extrapolation. If the number of
-2 7
FIGURE 8. PREVALENCE OF SEVERE AND MODERATE PROTEIN-CALORIE 
MALNUTRITION, BY REGION, 1963-73*
Reproduced from: Bengoa, J, M. and G. Donoso. Prevalence of
Protein-Calorie Malnutrition, 1963 to 1973." PAG Bulletin, vol. IV, 
no * 1 (1974), p. 31.
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those at greatest risk is to be estimated, therefore, we have no alter­
native but to do so rather arbitrarily.
Table 2 offers one method for doing this. In it the number of 
pregnant and lactating women is approximated by doubling the birth rate. 
To this figure is added the number of infants below five years of age. 
Arbitrary percentage estimates of those likely to be at risk nutritionally 
are then applied. A 10 percent assumption is not an unreasonable minimum 
for most developing countries, while a 50 percent figure would seem an 
absolute maximum. The resulting range of those at risk--62 million to 
309 million persons— defines a world hunger problem of vastly different 
dimensions than that conjured up by the World Bank study and The Fourth 
World Food Survey:
Insufficient Protein-Energy Supply Vulnerable People at Risk
10 Percent 50 Percent
Fourth Survey World Bank Assumption Assumption
Far East (ex-China) 297 736 26 131
China - - 14 71
Africa 83 190 9 46
Latin America 46 113 7 37'
Near East 29 91 _5 24
455 1,130 62 309
Although Table 2 includes China, which the two studies did not, even 
the 50 percent assumption yields figures well below the number of those 
considered to have an insufficient protein-calorie supply in The Fourth 
World Food Survey and about a quarter the number arrived at by the World 
Bank study.
About a year ago I was quoted In a front-page article in The New 
York Times to the effect that ’’food aid of only three million tons of 
grain a year, if it could be channeled to the truly needy, would enable 
100 million malnourished people to have an adequate diet.M Whence came 
this statistic? It was a guess, worked out during a telephone interview, 
that perhaps 100 million mothers and young children are seriously mal­
nourished and their average deficiency is in the neighborhood of 300 
calories per day. I cannot defend it. The truth could be 400 calories 
for 150 million people or 200 calories for 200 million. If the former, 
the deficit would be 6 million tons; if the latter,4 million tons. The 
point is that the deficits are trivial for a world which produces about 
1.5 billion tons of grain and in which about 200 million tons move 
annually in international trade. There is no doubt in my mind that such 
quantities would be immediately forthcoming— as FA0? s unexplained target 
of 10 million tons of food aid has not been— if the donors could be 
assured that the recipient countries would pass them on to those in 
true need.
Herein lies the rub. Few developing countries have so far shown 
themselves able to muster the medical expertise and administrative com­
petence to organize a nationwide system of maternal and child health 
clinics. In Sri Lanka, for instance, it is reckoned that at best 
perhaps only two-thirds of the children needing it are benefit ted by 
the country’s Thriposha weaning food program; and Sri Lanka is recog­
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Yet establishing such public health systems should be a priority 
matter everywhere, if only to help bring the birth rate under control.
It is now clear that rapid population growth can be contained rather 
quickly once certain preconditions have been achieved. Among the most 
important of these preconditions is a reduction in infant mortality, 
so that parents need no longer plan on two live births in order to feel 
reasonably assured that one child will reach maturity. io this end 
there are no more effective means than systems which provide supple­
mental food as well as medical services to mother and child.
Happily, there is a growing body of evidence which suggests these 
public health systems need not be as sophisticated as was once thought. 
This is certainly a lesson of the Chinese ,!baref oot doctor program.
If life expectancy in China is indeed half again what it was in 1949, 
the potential of relatively simple paramedical services should not be 
underestimated.
Similarly, new simplified methods of treatment of disease would 
seem to hold great promise. A case in point is the use of oral rehy­
dration therapy in the treatment of diarrhea. Diarrhea and its conse­
quences are among the major causes of infant mortality, there being 
perhaps 500 million episodes annually among preschool children worldwide.
Since the immediate causes of death from diarrhea are a loss of 
water and electrolytes, the essence of therapy is the replacement of 
these substances. The traditional form of doing so has been intrave­
nously— a form of treatment that requires the child be brought to a 
hospital or health care center. In the past few years, however, it has 
been found that oral administration of a mixture of water, electrolytes, 
and glucose in the home can have the same beneficial effects. A recent 
trial of the technique in rural India resulted in a reduction in fatali­
ties to one-fifth their previous level.
There are no doubt other innovations whose impact could be equally 
dramatic.
V. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF AFRICA -
I indicated in the introduction that I felt the hunger problem was 
now manageable and could be eliminated in virtually all parts of the 
world before the year 2000 given proper governmental resolve. That 
this will come to pass in Latin America and Asia I am reasonably cer­
tain. Whether it will also in sub-Saharan Africa is very much in doubt.
It is customary to think of hunger as being primarily a problem of 
Asia, and so it once probably was. But today the incidence of serious 
malnutrition is highest in Africa. Black Africa is the only region of 
the developing world where, if the statistics are to be believed, per 
capita food production has not risen, but declined during the past two 
decades. It is also the only region where life expectancy is still 
under 50 years and where the birth rate has not begun to decline. And 
finally (if we exclude Cambodia) it is the only region to have experi­
enced outright famine since the second world war.
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Why this dismal performance? It certainly does not stem from a 
shortage of resources. The amount of arable land per cultivator in 
Africa is more than double that in Asia. And the infrastructure left 
by the departing colonial administrators was not all that inappropriate 
for sustained economic growth.
The answer, of course, lies in political instability and the incom­
petence and corruption which have characterized so many African govern­
ments since independence.
The two countries which I know best--Ghana and Uganda--are depress­
ing cases in point. I spent some months in the early 1960s studying 
the system through which Ghana?s cities were fed, and was mightily 
impressed with its efficiency. Commodities moved smoothly into Accra 
from up to 300 miles away and there was rational substitution in the 
availability of staple foods from one season to the next. At indepen­
dence Ghana was the wealthiest country in tropical Africa. Today, 20 
years and five coups later, it is no longer. The cause is human folly. 
Ghana's once thriving cocoa industry is producing at a level 50 percent 
below that of the 1960s not because there is no demand for the product, 
but because the government, in an effort to enhance its revenues, compels 
growers to accept a price rather less than half that prevailing on the world 
market. And a chicken sells in Accra today for the equivalent of about 
a tenth of a senior civil servant's monthly salary— and fish, the poor 
man’s protein, for about three days labor per pound— not because the 
market women have lost their enterprise, but because fuel has become so 
expensive— and vehicles and roads have so deteriorated— that they can 
no longer exercise it.
The Uganda story is even sadder. Makerere University, where my 
family and I spent a delightful year in the late 1960s, had an excel­
lent academic tradition and was home to first-rate medical and agri­
cultural faculties. Again because I was studying the marketing system 
I was impressed with the liveliness and efficiency of producers and 
traders, and the wealth of the country. I suppose the less that is 
said of conditions today the better. Famine apparently is common among 
the Karamojong in the northeast, with armed helicopters needed last year 
to ride shotgun on relief shipments. The gentleman with whom I studied 
Kampala's food supply subsequently rose to become Dean of Makerere1s 
Faculty of Agriculture and Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the University. Sub­
sequent to that he had to disguise himself as a peasant and flee for 
his life from Idi Amin’s goon squads. Makerere is in a shambles.
What happened in Uganda is an extreme instance of the collapse of 
law and order in Africa. But it affords little satisfaction that the 
Ghanaian experience is more typical. A recent World Bank review con­
cluded that just about every African country enforced for the same poli­
tical reasons as in Ghana pricing policies which discourage the produc­
tion of food. Once in place such policies are extremely difficult to 
reverse.
The history of hunger and famine is not easy to trace. But to the 
extent that it is, it is evident that causality has laid more with man­
made than with natural events. If the 21st century witnesses the persis­
tence of hunger in Africa, or elsewhere, we will only have ourselves to 
blame.
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